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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-4786
___________
RASHEEN JOHNSON, 
                     Appellant
v.
TROY WILLIAMSON
____________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-00999)
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 2, 2009
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed November 3, 2009)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
PER CURIAM
Rasheen Johnson, a federal inmate, appeals from the denial of his habeas corpus
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  We will affirm.
In 2005, while housed at FCI-Greenville in Illinois, Johnson was charged in an
2incident report with extortion.  According to the charge, Johnson demanded, on three
occasions, that a fellow inmate send thousands of dollars to a post office box in Johnson’s
mother’s name, and threatened to have his “people” harm the inmate’s wife if he refused. 
Given the seriousness of the charge, a Unit Disciplinary Committee referred the
matter to a Discipline Hearing Officer (“DHO”).  At a hearing, Johnson denied engaging
in extortion and claimed that he was owed the money for a gambling debt.  Johnson
presented an inmate witness, who stated, among other things, that “[i]t’s all over the
compound that [the inmate victim] is trying to get [Johnson] for extortion.”  The evidence
before the DHO also included (i) copies of money orders sent by the inmate victim’s
relative to Johnson’s mother, and (ii) a report by a Special Investigative Service Officer
regarding interviews with the inmate victim and another inmate who claimed to have
witnessed Johnson’s actions. 
The DHO sustained the charge, explaining that he found the statements given by
the inmate victim and his corroborating witness more credible than Johnson’s denial.  The
DHO found that Johnson had jeopardized the safety of other inmates and their families,
and that “[he] and [his inmate] witness would have everything to gain and nothing to lose
by not telling the truth.”  The DHO also observed that the testimony of Johnson’s inmate
witness dealt in “generalities” by referring solely to what he “‘heard’ on the compound.” 
As a sanction, the DHO imposed twenty-one days of disciplinary segregation, disallowed
twenty-seven days of good-conduct time, and recommended a disciplinary transfer.
3Johnson appealed to the North Central Regional Office, challenging the DHO’s
decision to discredit his testimony.  The Regional Office denied the appeal.  It found that
while the DHO did “give more credibility to the [inmate victim’s] statement[,] ... he also
relied on other evidence....  In addition, ... the DHO met the standards of fairness,
impartiality, and burden of evidence on which to support his finding.”  Johnson next
appealed to the Office of General Counsel, again challenging the DHO’s decision to find
the evidence of extortion more credible and sufficient to sustain the charge.  The Office
of General Counsel denied the appeal.  It agreed with the DHO that the evidence supports
a finding of extortion, and it observed that “the required disciplinary procedures were
substantially followed, the greater weight of the evidence supports the DHO’s decision,
and appropriate sanctions were imposed.”
Johnson filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Illinois challenging the disciplinary proceeding
and resulting loss of good-conduct time.  His pro se petition raised essentially the
following claims:  (1) staff at FCI-Greenville failed properly to investigate the extortion
incident; (2) Johnson was not advised of his rights; (3) Johnson was not served with the
incident report within 24 hours of the conclusion of the investigation; (4) the case
manager and counselor failed to provide Johnson with a copy of their findings and
disposition within 24 hours of the conclusion of the Unit Disciplinary Committee review;
(5) the case manager and counselor denied Johnson an opportunity to call a relevant
4witness at the hearing; (6) Johnson was not given adequate notice of the charge in
advance of the hearing; (7) the DHO denied Johnson access to his inmate witness and
denied him an opportunity to review the statements against him prior to the hearing; (8)
Johnson was denied a staff representative; (9) the DHO failed to afford Johnson adequate
time to prepare for the hearing; (10) the administrative appeals process failed to protect
Johnson’s rights and violated BOP policy; and (11) the weight of the evidence fails to
support the DHO’s decision.  Johnson sought to have the report expunged from his
record, and his good-conduct time restored.
The government argued, inter alia, that Johnson failed to exhaust administrative
remedies on his due process claims, and, alternatively, that all of his claims are without
merit.  The Illinois District Court then transferred the matter to the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the judicial district in which Johnson is
housed.  The Middle District found that Johnson did not exhaust or attempt to exhaust the
administrative grievance process on his due process claims, i.e., claims (1) through (10),
and thus those claims must be denied.  While Johnson did preserve a challenge to the
weight of the evidence, the District Court held that because there is “some evidence” in
the record to support the DHO’s decision, that claim must fail.  Johnson timely appeals.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review is plenary
over a district court’s legal conclusions.  Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 263 (3d Cir. 2000).
With regard to the question of exhaustion, “[f]ederal prisoners are ordinarily
5required to exhaust their administrative remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to § 2241.”  Moscato v. Fed. Bureau. of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d
Cir. 1996).  Failure to satisfy the Bureau of Prison’s procedural rules for administrative
review can result in a procedural default, which will bar § 2241 review of a defaulted
claim unless the prisoner can show “cause and prejudice.”  Id. at 760-61.  Here, while
Johnson challenged the weight of the evidence and the DHO’s rejection of his credibility,
he did not argue on administrative review that he was denied due process in the ten
different ways that he has asserted in his habeas petition.  Because Johnson offers no
showing of “cause” to overcome his failure to raise these claims in the administrative
proceedings, the District Court properly declined to reach the merits.  
In any event, inasmuch as the Regional Director and the Office of General Counsel
independently reviewed the record and were satisfied that Johnson was afforded due
process, the record fully supports that determination.  A prisoner facing the loss of good-
conduct time as a result of an infraction is entitled to certain procedural protections in the
disciplinary proceedings.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1974).  The
minimum required protections are: “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary
charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional
goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a
written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the
disciplinary action.”  Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).  Johnson’s
6suggestion that he was denied any due process protection to which he was entitled is
utterly belied by the record, and indeed Johnson has offered no argument, and cited no
record support, for his alleged due process claims on this appeal. 
Finally, as to the claim that Johnson exhausted – the weight of the evidence –
federal habeas review requires only that the DHO’s decision be supported by “some
evidence” of guilt.  See Hill, 472 U.S. at 454.  “[T]he relevant question is whether there is
any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary
board.”  Id. at 455-56.  Here, the inmate testimony, the money orders reflecting payments
to Johnson’s mother, and the paucity of Johnson’s evidence countering the charge provide
“some evidence” to support the DHO’s determination.
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment denying habeas relief.
